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It is often a good strategy to “stand in the other person’s shoes” to see a situation
from a different perspective. People frequently attempt to infer what someone else
would recommend when no advisor is available to help with a decision. Such situations
commonly concern intertemporal or risky choices, and the usual assumption is that lay
people make such decisions differently than experts do. The aim of our study was to
determine what intertemporal and risky decisions people make when they take their
own perspective, the perspective of a peer, and the perspectives of an expert or an
entrepreneur. In a series of three experiments using a between-subject design, we
found that taking the peer’s perspective made participants behave more impulsively
and more risk aversely in relation to the participants’ own perspectives and in relation
to their perceptions of experts and entrepreneurs perspectives. Taking an expert’s or
an entrepreneur’s perspective did not change participants’ own intertemporal and risky
decisions. We explain the findings using the risk as value and the lesser mind theories.
Imagining the opponent’s perspective in a negotiation as one is advised to do might
inadvertently lead to problems because we always see her as more impulsive and more
risk averse than she really is. This means that taking a perspective of an expert – not a
peer – would be a good way to predict what decisions our opponents make.
Keywords: perspective taking, risk attitude, intertemporal choice, discounting, negotiations
INTRODUCTION
People often seek advice when making decisions. Consumers eagerly listen to the
recommendations of experts before making purchases, and managers employ specialized
staffers to assist them with their decision making. Unfortunately, knowledgeable advisors are
not always available when they’re needed, so people instead ask themselves “What would the
advisor do if the advisor were me?” In financial practice, many—if not most—decisions concern
intertemporal and risky choices, and extensive research has shown that individuals tend to be
impulsive and risk averse, that is, they generally prefer smaller gains now to larger ones in the
future and smaller certain gains to larger riskier ones. This research aims to determine whether
and how intertemporal and risky choices change when people take the perspective of others.
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The problem whether risk aversion and impulsivity vary with
perspective has been studied since the late 1960s, and it has
been shown that when participants assume the role of advisor or
are asked to make a recommendation on someone else’s behalf,
they tend to recommend greater risk aversion (Clark et al., 1971;
McCauley et al., 1971; Zaleska and Kogan, 1971; Kelling et al.,
1976) and greater impulsivity (O’Connell et al., 2013) than they
would display themselves. Possible explanations for the greater
risk aversion, while taking the perspective of others are the risk
as value theory (Brown, 1965; see also: Levinger and Schneider,
1969) and the lesser minds theory (Waytz et al., 2014). According
to the risk as value theory, taking risk is thought to be superior
behavior to avoiding risk. Thus, an advisor seeing himself or
herself as superior to the advisee will assume that that person is
more risk averse. According to the lesser minds theory, others
have dimmer minds. So if taking risks is thought to require a
superior intellect, then an advisor seeing himself or herself as
smarter than the advisee will assume that that person is more risk
averse. However, research conducted more recently has yielded
different results regarding the influence of perspective on risk,
that is, that peers tend to consider advisees to be less risk averse
(Hsee and Weber, 1997). This inconsistency between more risk
averse and less risk averse decisions while taking the perspective
of others led us to test this issue in two ways: using a standard
adjusting procedure (Du et al., 2002) and using the Holt and
Laury (2002) method. The lesser minds theory may also explain
greater impulsivity when taking the perspective of others. If
patience is also a value (as is risk; Ainslie, 1975, 2001; Read et al.,
1999) and if waiting requires a superior intellect (as does taking
risks), then taking the perspective of others will make people
more impulsive. Thus, when asked what peers would recommend
to them, people should say that those recommendations would
be worse than their own, in this case more risk averse and
more impulsive. On the other hand people have high opinions
of experts (Suen et al., 2014); therefore, they might say that
experts’ recommendations would be better than their own, in
this case less impulsive and less risk averse. However, Białek
and Sawicki (2014) showed that taking the perspective of an
expert shifts participants’ choices to being less impulsive but
more risk averse. People often know what decisions should be
made, but when it comes to acting, they behave in different
ways. Normative and descriptive approaches to decision making
can give different results. On one hand taking the perspective
of experts might decrease risk aversion, bringing the certainty
equivalent of a lottery closer to its expected value, on the other
hand Białek and Sawicki’s (2014) results reveal the opposite effect.
Experts, represent a normative approach to decision making, an
account of how people should act. It would be interesting to test
what decisions people make when they take the perspective of
someone who actually makes self-controlled and risky decisions.
Entrepreneurs represent a descriptive approach to self-controlled
and risk seeking decisions in that they really act that way.
Indeed, Macko and Tyszka (2009) revealed that in everyday
business decision making in risky situations, entrepreneurs make
more risky choices than non-entrepreneurs. Carland et al. (1995)
and Stewart et al. (1999) showed that entrepreneurs have less
risk aversion than non-entrepreneurs. Moreover, a propensity
for risk seeking is posited to be one of variables underlying
entrepreneurship (Sexton and Bowman, 1986; McGrath and
MacMillan, 1992). Therefore, along with testing human decisions
while taking the perspective of peers, we found it important
to add experts as representative of the normative approach
to decision making and entrepreneurs as representative of the
descriptive approach. We presume that people will express less
impulsivity and less risk aversion while taking the perspective
of experts, who have a knowledge of how to make decisions
and while taking the perspective of entrepreneurs who make
self-controlled and risky decisions in practice.
Our research concerns both intertemporal and risky decisions.
We compare decisions participants would make as themselves
with the decisions they believe that a peer would recommend
them to make and the decisions they believe that an expert or
entrepreneur would recommend them to make. We suggest the
following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1 – Taking the perspective of peers will result in
increasing impulsivity and risk aversion.
Hypothesis 2 – Taking the perspective of experts will result in
decreasing impulsivity and risk aversion.
Hypothesis 3 – Taking the perspective of entrepreneurs will
result in decreasing impulsivity and risk aversion.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
General Method
We conducted three experiments: Study 1 addressed delay
discounting (impulsivity); Study 2a addressed probability
discounting (risk attitude); Study 2b also addressed risk attitude,
but using a different approach than Study 2a. In Studies
1 and 2a, there were four independent conditions: (1) the
“own perspective” condition (the instructions were for the
participant to “choose what you would do”); (2) the “other
person’s perspective” condition (the instructions were for the
participant to “imagine what an average student would advise
you to choose”); (3) the “expert’s perspective” condition (the
instructions were for the participant to “imagine what an expert
would advise you to choose”); (4) the “entrepreneur’s perspective”
condition (the instructions were for the participant to “imagine
what an entrepreneur would advise you to choose”). In Study 2b,
we used only instructions from conditions 1 and 2.
The present research was done with hypothetical rewards
rather than real ones, it having been shown that the discounting
process is comparable across real and hypothetical payments
(Johnson and Bickel, 2002; Madden et al., 2003; Lawyer et al.,
2011; Matusiewicz et al., 2013). At the time of the study, PLN
5,000 was approximately equal to USD 1,400.
Participants
All participants were undergraduate students at the Warsaw
University of Life Sciences and at Kozminski University.
All procedures were approved by the ethics committee of
Kozminski University. Informed consent was gathered before
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the experiment. Participants were not reimbursed for their
participation in the experiment.
Data Analysis
Studies 1 and 2a used selection criteria based upon the
expectation of a monotonically decreasing discounting function
similar to the algorithm used by Johnson and Bickel (2008).
Discounting data was considered non-systematic and excluded
from further analysis if: (1) the subjective value given by a
participant in the first indifference point was lower than the
last indifference point or (2) the participant’s indifference points
increased across consecutive delays or probabilities by more than
20% of the larger, later or the larger, more probable reward.
Excluding these non-systematic cases had no effect on the
directions of the effects or on the conclusions to be drawn from
the studies. The selection criteria used in Study 2b are described
below.
The analyses of Studies 1 and 2a were performed on the area
under the discounting curve (AUC) as described in Myerson
et al. (2001), which means that the analyses were model-
neutral. The AUC distributions in Studies 1 and 2a and the
risk seeking index distributions in Study 2b were non-normally
distributed, as shown by visual inspection of the histograms
and Shapiro–Wilk significance tests. Therefore, all analyses
employed non-parametric statistics and medians rather than
means.
STUDY 1
Participants
A total of 227 participants (91 male and 136 female from ages
19 to 52) were randomly assigned to the four conditions. After
16 were excluded for non-systematic data, the remaining 211
were distributed as follows: 52 own perspective, 53 other person’s
perspective, 53 expert’s perspective, and 53 entrepreneur’s
perspective.
Procedure
Participants were tested individually in a classroom. We used a
computerized procedure (standard personal computer) in which
participants were asked to choose between two panels on the
screen. In the first panel, the smaller adjusting amount of money
was presented and in the second panel the larger, fixed amount
of money was shown together with the delay. Amounts of money
and delays were presented in a text format.
Participants were asked to choose between a smaller amount
now and a larger amount later, from the perspective of their
assigned condition. The first choice was between PLN 2,500 now
and PLN 5,000 later. If the smaller amount now was chosen,
the amount now was decreased; if the larger amount later were
chosen, the amount now was increased. The size of the decrease
or increase was PLN 5,000/2k, where k was the numerical order of
that choice from the second (k = 2) through the seventh (k = 7).
The total number of choices was six, and the indifference point
was the value of the smaller amount after the final PLN 39.0625
adjustment following the sixth choice. Each adjusting value was
rounded to the nearest integer. Participants made this series of
choices for four different delays (1 month, 6 months, 2 years, and
5 years) to obtain four indifference points.
Results
As expected, the longer the delay of the larger amount, the
smaller the amount someone prefers to take immediately
(Figure 1A). According to a Kruskal–Wallis independent
group test, there were significant differences in the AUCs for
the delay discounting curves [χ2(3) = 26.919; p < 0.001].
Pairwise comparisons with a Mann–Whitney U test (with the
Bonferroni correction) showed a significant difference between
the “own perspective” and the “other person’s perspective” AUCs
(p = 0.011, r = 0.343), between the “other person’s perspective”
and the “expert’s perspective” (p < 0.001, r = 0.476), and
between “other person’s perspective” and the “entrepreneur’s
perspective” (p = 0.001; r = 0.848). There was no significant
difference between the “own perspective” and the “expert’s
perspective” and the “entrepreneur’s perspective” (respectively,
FIGURE 1 | (A) The median indifference point (as a percentage of the delayed PLN 5,000) for each of the four lengths of delay of the larger amount for each of the
conditions. (B) Mean ranks for the AUCs for each of the conditions.
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TABLE 1 | Median area under the curve (AUC) with interquartile range
across experimental conditions during delay discounting.
Median AUC 25th percentile 75th percentile
Own 0.660 0.300 0.814
Peer 0.347 0.176 0.521
Expert 0.646 0.458 0.884
Entrepreneur 0.634 0.425 0.810
p = 1 in both cases, unadjusted p = 0.263 and p = 0.546). There
were also no differences between “expert’s” and “entrepreneur’s”
perspectives (p = 1, unadjusted p = 0.605). These results show
that discounting becomes steeper when participants take the
perspective of a peer in comparison to their own, expert’s or
entrepreneur’s perspectives. Mean ranks for all conditions are
shown in Figure 1B. The descriptive statistics corresponding
to raw, not ranked, data of area under the curve in different
conditions are presented in Table 1.
Discussion Study 1
Our results show that when taking the perspective of peers, one
makes more present-oriented decisions than on one’s own. In
other words, people perceive peer advisors as more impulsive
than themselves. Our own discount functions are less steep
than “taking our peer’s perspective” discount functions. These
results are in line with previous research. O’Connell et al. (2013)
found that people discount delayed rewards less steeply for
themselves than when taking the perspective of someone they
know. On the other hand, a study by Ziegler and Tunney (2012)
showed that taking the perspective of another person shifts
preferences toward later, larger rewards, that is, reduces delay
discounting. The last seems not to be in accordance with our
research, however, Ziegler and Tunney (2012) asked participants
“what should the other person choose?” and not “what advice
would the other person give?” A common assumption is that
impulsivity is a vice whereas self-control is a virtue; therefore,
when asked what one should do, people indicate less impulsive
choices.
Our research shows that participants taking the perspective of
an expert or entrepreneur make temporal choices very similar to
the ones they would make from their own perspective. Although
the mean ranks were quantitatively higher for the entrepreneur’s
and expert’s perspectives than for one’s own perspective, which
would indicate that taking the perspective of an expert would
diminish ones impulsivity, the differences were not statistically
significant. Study one has failed to confirm hypothesis 2 and
hypothesis 3 regarding impulsivity.
STUDY 2A
Participants
A total of 286 participants (103 male and 183 female aged 19–
48) were randomly assigned to the four conditions. After 22
were excluded for non-systematic data, the remaining 264 were
distributed as follows: 64 own perspective, 67 other person’s
perspective, 66 expert’s perspective, and 67 entrepreneur’s
perspective.
Procedure
The procedure was the same as in Study 1, except that all
choices were between a smaller certain amount and a larger
riskier amount. As in the previous study, participants were tested
individually in a classroom using a computerized procedure.
Participants made this series of choices for 4 different levels of
risk (90, 70, 30, and 10%) to obtain four indifference points.
Results
As expected, the smaller the probability of a larger amount of
money, the smaller the amount of money a participant prefers to
take with certainty (Figure 2A). According to a Kruskal–Wallis
independent group test, there were significant differences in the
FIGURE 2 | (A) The median indifference point (as a percentage of the uncertain PLN 5,000) for each of the four odds against the larger amount for each of the
conditions (as advised by Rachlin et al., 1991) and widely used in research on discounting, the x-axis is in terms of the odds against the larger amount and not the
probability of the larger amount). (B) The mean ranks for the AUCs for each of the conditions.
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AUCs for the probability discounting curves [χ2(3) = 21.731;
p < 0.001]. Pairwise comparisons with a Mann–Whitney U
test (with the Bonferroni correction) showed a significant
difference between the “own perspective” and the “other person’s
perspective” AUCs (p = 0.035, r = 0.277), between the “other
person’s perspective” and the “expert’s perspective” (p = 0.001,
r = 0.400), and between “other person’s perspective” and the
“entrepreneur’s perspective” (p < 0.001; r = 0.455). These results
show that when taking the other person’s perspective participants
discount risky gains more steeply than when taking their own,
experts or entrepreneur’s perspectives, that is, they exhibit more
risk aversion.
There was no significant difference between the “own
perspective” and the “expert’s perspective” or the “entrepreneur’s
perspective” [respectively, p = 1 (unadjusted p = 0.263) and
p = 0.634 (unadjusted p = 0.023)]. There was also no difference
between “expert’s” and “entrepreneur’s” perspectives (p = 1,
unadjusted p = 0.206). The mean ranks for all the conditions are
presented in Figure 2B. The descriptive statistics corresponding
to raw, not ranked, data of area under the curve in different
conditions are presented in Table 2.
STUDY 2B
Our results of Study 2a confirm investigations made by Brown
(1965), Clark et al. (1971) and others, showing the increase of
risk aversion while taking the perspective of peers. Nevertheless,
our results seem inconsistent with the more recent research by
TABLE 2 | Median area under the curve (AUC) with interquartile range
across experimental conditions during probability discounting.
Median AUC 25th percentile 75th percentile
Own 0.233 0.143 0.302
Peer 0.107 0.041 0.197
Expert 0.194 0.102 0.325
Entrepreneur 0.273 0.170 0.410
Hsee and Weber (1997) indicating a decrease of risk aversion.
Therefore, we decided to perform an additional experiment on
risk attitude while taking a peer perspective using the Holt and
Laury (2002) method.
Participants
A total of 54 participants (23 male and 31 female aged 20
to 49 years) were randomly assigned to the two conditions
as follows: 28 own perspective (the instructions were for the
participant to “choose what you would do, lottery [A or B]”) and
26 other person’s perspective condition (the instructions were
for the participant to “imagine what an average student would
advise you to choose, lottery [A or B]”). Two participants were
excluded from the analyses for irrational choices as described
below.
Procedure
Study 2b employed a traditional pen and paper questionnaire.
The study was conducted individually in a classroom. Given the
perspective of their randomly assigned conditions, participants
were asked to choose either Lottery A or Lottery B in Table 3
for the 10 different pairs of alternatives (participants were not
provided with the calculations of expected values). Only very
risk seeking participants would choose Lottery B in pair 1, and
only very risk averse participants would choose Lottery A in
pair 9. (Participants not choosing Lottery B—the only rational
choice—in pair 10 were the two which were eliminated from
the analysis.) The earlier in the series that participants begin to
choose Lottery B, the more risk seeking they are; the later, the
more risk averse.
Results
The mean rank was 34.12 for the “own perspective” group
and 18.88 for the “other person’s perspective” group. This was
a significant difference according to a Mann–Whitney U test
(U = 140,000; p < 0.001; r = 0.502). The effect size indicates the
moderate impact of experimental manipulation on the dependent
variable. On average, as indicated by median, participants in the
“own perspective” group made 7 out of 10 choices indicating
TABLE 3 | Payoff structure in Experiment 2b.
LOTTERY A (“safe” option) LOTTERY B (“risky” option) Expected values (in PLN)
Chance PLN Chance PLN chance PLN chance PLN EV – A EV – B Difference (EVA – EVB)
1 10% 20 90% 16 10% 37 90% 1 16,4 4,6 11,8
2 20% 20 80% 16 20% 37 80% 1 16,8 8,2 8,6
3 30% 20 70% 16 30% 37 70% 1 17,2 11,8 5,4
4 40% 20 60% 16 40% 37 60% 1 17,6 15,4 2,2
5 50% 20 50% 16 50% 37 50% 1 18 19 –1
6 60% 20 40% 16 60% 37 40% 1 18,4 22,6 –4,2
7 70% 20 30% 16 70% 37 30% 1 18,8 26,2 –7,4
8 80% 20 20% 16 80% 37 20% 1 19,2 29,8 –10,6
9 90% 20 10% 16 90% 37 10% 1 19,6 33,4 –13,8
10 100% 20 0% 16 100% 37 0% 1 20 37 –17
All probabilities were presented in form of chances of obtaining the reward in percentages (based on: Holt and Laury, 2002).
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risk-taking, and participants in the “other persons” group made
5 out of 10 choices indicating risk. The results show that
participants in the other person’s perspective group were more
risk averse.
Discussion Studies 2a and 2b
Using the adjusting procedure in Study 2a, we found that taking
the perspective of a peer results in an increase of risk aversion in
relation to taking one’s own perspective. These results contradict
those of Hsee and Weber (1997), which showed a decrease of risk
aversion when taking a peer’s perspective. In order to explain such
a self-others discrepancy in risky choices, we conducted Study 2b
using a different method – the Holt and Laury (2002) approach—
which study gave the same results as Study 2a. Since the results
obtained by both methods are congruent, we regarded replication
of other conditions from Study 2a, using the Holt and Laury
(2002) method, as redundant. Taking the perspective of a peer
increases risk aversion in relation to taking one’s own perspective.
Our results do not support those of Białek and Sawicki (2014),
who found that when participants took the expert’s perspective,
they exhibited greater risk aversion. Instead, our research shows
that taking the perspectives of experts and entrepreneurs does
not change the appraisal of risky payoffs in comparison to one’s
choices.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
In a business context, negotiations demand an assessment of the
opponent’s position, and in private life, it is always advisable
to imagine the point of view of a partner. The main aim
of our research was to test how a shift of perspective affects
intertemporal and risky decisions.
People commonly regard that recommendations gave by their
peers are worse than their own, in this case more risk averse and
more impulsive. On the contrary, having high opinions of experts
(Suen et al., 2014), people may regard experts’ advice as better
than their own. Entrepreneurs especially exhibit both high self-
control and low risk aversion (Carland et al., 1995; Stewart et al.,
1999; Macko and Tyszka, 2009). Experts represent a normative
approach to a decision making whereas entrepreneurs represent a
descriptive approach to self-controlled and risk seeking decisions
in that they really act that way.
Our Hypothesis 1 (Taking the perspective of peers will result
in increasing impulsivity and risk aversion) has been confirmed,
whereas our Hypothesis 2 (Taking the perspective of experts
will result in decreasing impulsivity and risk aversion, and
Hypothesis 3 (Taking the perspective of entrepreneurs will result
in decreasing impulsivity and risk aversion) have not been
confirmed. When taking the perspective of a peer, participants
showed greater impulsivity and greater risk aversion. When
taking an expert’s or entrepreneur’s perspective participants
did not change intertemporal and risky choices from those
they would make on they own. However, when taking the
perspective of an expert or entrepreneur participants behaved less
impulsively and more risk seeking than when taking the peer’s
perspective.
Previous research shows that people discount delayed rewards
more steeply (are more impulsive) when taking the perspective
of peers (O’Connell et al., 2013), which is consistent with our
results. There has been almost no research on intertemporal
choices while taking the perspective of experts. Białek and Sawicki
(2014) showed that taking the perspective of an expert shifts
participants’ choices to being less impulsive. Our study did not
show this effect, and we did not observe any difference in
participants’ intertemporal choices while taking the perspective
of an entrepreneur.
Risk attitudes while taking the perspective of others have
generally been shown to change in the direction of greater risk
aversion (Brown, 1965; Clark et al., 1971; McCauley et al., 1971;
Zaleska and Kogan, 1971; Kelling et al., 1976). Some researchers
(Hsee and Weber, 1997), however, obtained the opposite results.
This marked inconsistency led us to conduct the research on risk
attitude while taking a peer perspective in two different ways:
using a standard adjusting procedure (Du et al., 2002) and using
the Holt and Laury (2002) method. Regardless of the method
used, it turns out that taking the perspective of peers evokes
greater risk aversion.
Our research shows no significant change in risk attitude when
comparing one’s own choices and those made while taking the
perspective of an expert or even an entrepreneur. We did not
confirm the finding of Białek and Sawicki (2014), who showed
that taking the perspective of an expert evoked greater risk
aversion. They raise an important question whether taking the
perspective of an expert is a proper tool of debiasing people.
As they show, the increase of self-control can be regarded as
debiasing, but the increase of risk aversion cannot. It would be
interesting to investigate other perspectives that might decrease
people’s risk aversion.
Why do people imagine choices of peers being different from
their own (more impulsive and more risk averse), while there is
no difference in impulsivity and risk attitude when taking the
perspective of an expert or entrepreneur? Risk as value theory
(Brown, 1965) ascribes a positive attitude toward risky choices;
taking risk deserves respect and approval (Shapira, 1995). The
lesser mind theory states that people view others’ minds as
lesser than their own (Waytz et al., 2014), generally regarding
themselves as better than others in many areas (e.g., Svenson
et al., 1985). Perceiving others as having dimmer minds, people
conclude that others will not possess the virtues of risk taking and
patience. People have high opinions both of experts (Suen et al.,
2014) and of themselves, so we might have expected there to be
no difference between what participants would do themselves and
what they think experts (or entrepreneurs) would recommend
that they do. Furthermore, individuals want to maintain high
self-esteem (Crocker and Park, 2004) and consistent feelings of
personal worth (Brown, 1986; Brown et al., 1988).
Various tasks people face in their lives can be divided into
two categories: competence tasks and moral tasks (Wojciszke,
2005). Medical doctors and auto mechanics seem to deal mostly
with competence tasks, whereas psychotherapists deal with moral
ones. The latter do not strictly follow objective criteria in their
work and seem to rely in some part on intuition. In our opinion,
people perceive their own decisions in competence fields as worse
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than those made by experts, but they think their moral abilities
are equal to those of experts. Resisting temptation and sticking to
long-term goals is regarded as a virtue (Ainslie, 1975, 2001; Read
et al., 1999). Similarly, risk taking is treated as a value (Brown
et al., 1988). Thus intertemporal and risky decisions seem to
belong to the moral category resulting in a finding that when
taking the perspective of an expert or entrepreneur, there is no
significant change in people’s preferences toward either delayed
or risky payments.
Credible experts are perceived as holding opinions consistent
with one’s own (Raviv et al., 1993; Bonaccio and Dalal, 2006)
and recommending risky actions (Barnoy et al., 2010; Bar-Tal
et al., 2013). This may be an explanation why people do not
change their choices while taking the perspective of an expert
or entrepreneur, believing that experts should behave just like
themselves.
Taking the perspective of a peer does not reflect the risky
and intertemporal decisions people really make for themselves.
Actually being able to take someone else’s perspective in a
negotiation may be an illusion. People cannot put themselves in
their opponents’ shoes, seeing them as are more risk averse and
impulsive (and less capable of performing the feats of making
good decisions) than they really are. On the other hand, taking the
perspective of an expert or entrepreneur does not change people’s
own risky or intertemporal decisions. This means that taking a
perspective of an expert – not a peer – would be a good way to
predict what decisions our opponents make.
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